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Evolutionary Game Dynamics for Two Interacting Populations under
Environmental Feedback
Lulu Gong1, Jian Gao2, and Ming Cao1
Abstract—We study the evolutionary dynamics of games
under environmental feedback using replicator equations for
two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider
jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and
the state of the environment: the payoff matrix varies with
the changing environment and at the same time, the state of
the environment is affected indirectly by the changing payoff
matrix through the evolving population profiles. For such co-
evolutionary dynamics, we investigate whether convergence will
take place, and if so, how. In particular, we identify the
scenarios where oscillation offers the best predictions of long-
run behavior by using reversible system theory. The obtained
results are useful to describe the evolution of multi-community
societies in which individuals’ payoffs and societal feedback
interact.
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory [1] is widely used to model
population dynamics for social and ecological systems since
it offers insightful results under meaningful simplification.
There exist various classic models, among which the repli-
cator dynamics play a prominent role [2]; in this model,
the individuals in a well-mixed population play games with
each other according to a mutually known payoff matrix .
When the collective of individuals can be divided into several
populations according to certain constraints, such as local
interactions or genetic relationships, multi-population games
take place. Then each population can be taken as a cohesive
community whose members play games with players from
other populations according to corresponding payoff matrices
[3], [4]. The replicator dynamics for the multi-population
evolutionary games have been developed in [5], [6], [7].
On the other hand, in classic evolutionary game theory,
it is generally assumed that the related payoff matrix is
constant and not affected by the evolution itself. That is to
say, the players will receive pre-determined payoffs whenever
every player has chosen a candidate strategy for the current
game play. In practical scenarios from ecological systems or
human society, however, the incentives or punishments for
the individuals in a game may dynamically change because
of changing environment [8], [9], [10], [11]. In public goods
dilemmas where the use of common resource, such as water
and pasture, is involving, the contest in real population not
only modifies the social composition, but also may have a
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marked effect on the value of subsequent rewards [12]. If
the shared resource is limited, “the tragedy of the commons”
will be the inevitable fate for all players [13]. However, in
some practical situations, the outcome of such evolutionary
public goods games can be much more complicated when
the shared resources are not only affected by the actions
of individuals but also act back on the strategic choices of
the populations through influencing the payoffs in the game
process [14], [15], [16]. In fact, some actions may be in
favor of enhancing the environment while the others weaken
it. On the other hand, the environmental context can also in
turn have influence on the individual actions by changing the
current payoff matrices. Thus a feedback mechanism arises
from the environmental state to the game dynamics.
So far, most of the existing works have been focusing on
the dynamics of population profiles under the given fixed
payoff matrices, but environmental feedback on game dy-
namics has not been taken into account adequately. Recently,
the environment factors have received surging interests, and
their influence is attracting more and more attention [17]. The
co-evolution of strategies and games have been studied in
[18], which shows the path to the collapse of cooperation; in
particular, the evolvability of payoffs in a fixed environment
is discussed, but the direct relation between payoffs and en-
vironment is not considered. It is studied in [19] how a single
population evolves with a changing environmental resource
using replicator equations. The corresponding system therein
exhibits interesting oscillating behavior when the game is
characterized by a payoff matrix modified from the prisoner
dilemma. Indeed, the single population replicator equations
combined with an environment factor take the form of an
integrable system which admits constants of motion. Hence,
it can be proved that the periodic orbits exist using level sets
of the corresponding energy function.
When the structure of population is extended from a single
population to multiple populations, it is of great interest to
study whether convergence will take place in such situation,
and if so, how. In addition, it will be more challenging to
identify complicated dynamics in such a multi-dimensional
system. The main contributions of the paper are as follows.
The dynamic and environment-dependent payoff matrices are
utilized to indicate the feedback of environment to game
dynamics. Then we consider the multi-population game dy-
namics and the environment state simultaneously and obtain
a model of a closed-loop and coupled system. For two
interacting populations case, we derive sufficient conditions
for the convergence to boundary points. More importantly,
we identify the scenarios where oscillation offers the best
predictions of long-run behavior by using reversible system
theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces how the game and environment dynamics
are modeled with necessary background information. Sec-
tion III provides the main results: First, the conditions for
convergence in the closed-loop system is analyzed with
an illustrative example; then more complicated dynamics
are analyzed thoroughly when the payoffs are in the form
of a modified prisoner’s dilemma; and lastly, a qualitative
approach is used to prove the resulting periodic orbits by
applying reversible system theory. In the last section, we
conclude our contribution and discuss the directions for
further study.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Replicator dynamics
As one of the most well-known models in evolutionary
game theory, the replicator dynamics describe the evolution
of the frequencies of strategies in a well-mixed population
[2]. Consider a matrix game with a finite set of m pure
strategies, {s1, . . . ,sm}, and the entries of the payoff matrix A
are ai j for i, j = 1, . . . ,m. Let pi be the proportion of the in-
dividuals who choose si, and denote p= [p1, . . . , pm]
T . Then
the single-population replicator dynamics are determined by
setting the growth rate p˙i proportional to the difference
between the expected utility of si and the average utility in
the whole population, namely
p˙i = pi[Ui(p)−U¯(p)], (1)
where Ui(p) = (Ap)i is si’s and U¯(p) = p
TAp is the average
utility. Note that the replicator dynamics (1) are defined on
the simplex ∆ = {p|∑i pi = 1}. It has been proved [2] that
∆ is invariant under (1).
Now we extend the single-population replicator dynamics
(1) to the multi-population case. Consider an n-population
system and its replicator dynamics
p˙ki = p
k
i [U
k
i (p)−U¯k(p)], (2)
where pki is the proportion of individuals in population k,
k= 1, . . . ,n, who are currently using si and p= [p
1, . . . , pn]T ,
where pk is determined by the proportions of the players of
different strategies in population k. It can be easily verified
that the state space of the whole population, which becomes
a polyhedron, denoted by Θ, is invariant under (2), so do
Θ’s interior and boundary respectively.
B. Dynamic payoff matrices
To model the feedback of the environment to game dynam-
ics, we introduce the dynamic payoff matrices. According
to [11], [19], changes in the richness of biological envi-
ronments, or the economic situation of governing bodies in
social settings, sometimes can be captured by varying the
payoff matrices by a multiplication factor. Therefore, we
consider the matrix games where the payoff varies with a
scalar environment variable r, which will be explained in
detail in the coming subsection. In particular, we assume
that the entries of each payoff matrix depend affinely on r,
i.e., 

a11r+ b11 . . . a1mr+ b1m
...
. . .
...
am1r+ bm1 . . . ammr+ bmm

 . (3)
C. Environmental factor
To address in depth the environment’s influence on game
dynamics and vice versa, the environment in [19] is modeled
by a scalar function coupled with game dynamics. We will
use this mechanism to consider the multi-population games
and environment dynamics. To be more specific, we represent
the change of the environmental resource r by a continuous
scalar function, i.e.,
r˙ = r(1− r)h(p), (4)
where the r is rescaled to be confined in the range [0,1];
h(p) denotes the feedback of the individuals’ actions on the
environment. The environmental state changes as a result of
the states of the populations and the sign of h(p) determines
whether r will decrease or increase, corresponding to envi-
ronmental degradation or enhancement, respectively.
D. Mathematical model
For the sake of simplicity, we start by considering the case
of two interacting populations. In this case, each individual
from population k = 1,2 only interacts with an individual
from the other population. Such games are usually referred
to as bi-matrix games. In addition, we assume that each
population k has only two strategies {s1,s2}. Since there are
two available strategies in each population, the population
profile can be defined by pk = [pk1 1− pk1]T where pk1 is the
frequency of strategy s1 and 1− pk1 the frequency of strategy
s2 in population k. Thus, in every population we only need
to focus on the evolution of the proportion of one strategy.
Hereafter we denote x = p11 and y = p
2
1. We consider the
strategy set in the context of the cooperation-defection game
as a means to motivate our analysis, i.e., the proportion of
the first strategy, cooperation, enriches the resource and the
proportion of the second strategy, defection, consumes the
resource.
The interactions between the two populations are de-
scribed by the following dynamic payoff matrices A(r) and
B(r):
A(r) =
[
a(r) b(r)
c(r) d(r)
]
and B(r) =
[
e(r) f (r)
g(r) h(r)
]
.
Note that generally A(r) 6= B(r), and thus the games are
asymmetric. More precisely, if a player in population 1 plays
s1 against a player in population 2 playing s2, then the first
player receives the payoff b(r) and the second player obtains
the payoff g(r). Then the utility functions are given by
U1i = (A(r)y)i , U
2
i = (B(r)x)i , (5)
where y=
[
y 1− y]T and x= [x 1− x]T .
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Combine the game dynamics (2) and environment equation
(4), then we have the corresponding 3-dimensional co-
evolutionary system

x˙= x(1− x) f (y,r)
y˙= y(1− y)g(x,r)
r˙ = r(1− r)h(x,y),
(6)
where
f (y,r) =U11 −U21
= (a(r)− b(r)− c(r)+ d(r))y+ b(r)− d(r), (7)
and
g(x,r) =U12 −U22
= (e(r)− f (r)− g(r)+ h(r))x+ f (r)− h(r). (8)
In addition, we assume h(x,y) is of the following form:
h(x,y) = θ1x− (1− x)+θ2y− (1− y)
= (1+θ1)x+(1+θ2)y− 2,
(9)
in which θ1 > 0 and θ2 > 0 represent the ratios of the
enhancement rate to degradation rate.
Compared with the conventional replicator dynamics (2),
this model is more complicated because the payoff matrices
are environment dependent and the strategies and environ-
ment dynamics are deeply coupled. One immediately can
get some basic properties of this new system. Since all the
variables, x, y and r, just vary in the range [0,1], the domain
for the whole system (6) is exactly the unit cube [0,1]3 in the
Cartesian coordinates. And through the structure of equations
(6) one can easily prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Fixed points): The system (6) has eight obvi-
ous fixed points which are exactly on the eight corners of
the cubic domain, i.e., (0,0,0), (1,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,0,1),
(1,1,0), (1,0,1), (0,1,1) and (1,1,1).
Lemma 2 (Invariant sets): For system (6), the following
statements hold
• the whole domain [0,1]3 is a positively invariant set;
• the 6 faces of this cube are positively invariant sets.
Because of the above invariance properties, the system dy-
namics on the 6 faces are reduced to planar cases. Therefore
it is trivial to analyze them, and we omit discussing these
planar dynamics hereafter and focus on the 3-dimensional
dynamics.
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Convergence
The coexistence of states in both populations has always
been the main subject of bi-matrix game. For this reason, we
are going to analyze the convergence and non-convergence
of the dynamics of (6).
Theorem 3: When the dynamic payoff matrices (3) ad-
mit weakly dominating strategies, the corresponding co-
evolutionary dynamics (6) will always converge to the
boundary for the initial conditions (x0,y0,r0).
Proof: Without loss of generality, let the first strategy
be the weakly dominating strategy for the first population.
Then the payoff matrix A(r) takes the following form[
a(r) b(r)
c(r) d(r)
]
, a(r)≥ c(r),b(r)≥ d(r).
As all entries of A(r) are affine functions of r, the equality
signs of the above inequalities hold only when r is exactly
at its maximum or minimum. Then the replicator equation
corresponding to x becomes
x˙= x(1− x)[(a(r)− c(r))y+(b(r)− d(r))(1− y)].
Immediately one can check that the term in the square
bracket is always positive for any initial r0 ∈ (0,1). As
a result, x will converge to 1. When r0 = 0 or r0 = 1,
the dynamics will be restricted in a plane because of the
invariance according to Lemma 2.
Similarly one can prove convergence for y. When the states
x and y reach their maximums or minimums, the sign of r˙
will depend on the parameters θ1 and θ2. Given these two
parameters are constant, r will arrive at some fixed point
asymptotically.
We now use an example to illustrate the convergence.
Example 3.1: The Hawk-Dove game with dynamic payoff
matrices.
A version of the Hawk-Dove game [1] takes the following
environment-dependent form,
A(r) =
[
0.5r 1
0 0.5
]
, B(r) =
[
0.5 0
1 0.5r
]
.
Obviously the cooperation strategy corresponds to the
unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) for the first population and
the defection strategy for the second population respectively,
whenever r ∈ (0,1). But when r reaches its maximum or min-
imum, these two strategies are not NE anymore. Therefore,
they are only weakly dominating strategies.
The corresponding system now becomes

x˙= x(1− x)(0.5ry− 0.5y+ 0.5)
y˙= y(1− y)(0.5rx− 0.5x− 0.5r)
r˙ = r(1− r)[(1+θ1)x+(1+θ2)y− 2].
(10)
From the computation of the Jacobian, one can check the
stability of the trivial corner equilibria. Obviously, five of the
equilibria, (0,0,0), (0,0,1), (1,1,0), (0,1,1) and (1,1,1),
are unstable because all the Jacobians have at least one
positive eigenvalue. It is, however, not clear whether the
other equilibria are stable or not, since their Jocobians are
dependent of parameters.
However, in the first equation (0.5ry− 0.5y+ 0.5) =
0.5ry+ 0.5(1− y) ≥ 0 and the equality holds only when
y= 1,r= 0. Thus, x will converge to 1 if x0 6= 0. In contrast,
in the second equation (0.5rx−0.5x−0.5r) = 0.5x(r−1)−
0.5r≤ 0 and the equality holds only when x= 0,r= 0. So it
always holds that y will converge to 0 as expected if y0 6= 0
initially. As a consequence, there are two more critical sets,
i.e., lines {y = 1,r = 0} and {x = 0,r = 0}, excluding the
eight corner equilibrium points.
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For r, consider the open set (0,1)3, which contains no
equilibrium point as (0.5ry− 0.5y+ 0.5) > 0 and (0.5rx−
0.5x− 0.5r)< 0. Hence, every trajectory will go towards a
point on the boundary {x= 1,y= 0}, when the starting point
is inside [0,1]3. Further, on the line {x= 1,y= 0}, we have
r˙ = r(1− r)[(1+θ1)x+(1+θ2)y− 2] = r(1− r)(θ1− 1).
Thus, the evolution of r depends on the parameter θ1. To
sum up, the trajectory will asymptotically converge to the
fixed point x= 1,y= 0,r = 1 if θ1 > 1 or to the fixed point
x= 1,y= 0,r= 0 if θ1 < 1. For the case θ1 = 1, the trajectory
will stay there after it reaches the line {x = 1,y = 0}. The
different situations are showed in Fig. 1.
In this example the states of both of the two populations
cannot co-exist no matter what values the parameters θ1,θ2
take. In other words, the environment factor does not make a
big difference to the outcome of game dynamics even when
the payoff matrices admit only weakly dominating strategies.
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(c) θ1 = 1.5
Fig. 1: Convergence of the trajectories when θ2 = 0.5 and
θ1 = 0.5 (a), θ1 = 1 (b), θ1 = 1.5 (c). The left panels show the
time evolution of (x,y,r) corresponding to the same initial
condition (0.1,0.8,0.99). In the right panels the distinct tra-
jectories correspond to initial conditions (0.1,0.1,0.01) (red),
(0.1,0.8,0.99) (green), (0.1,0.2,0.9) (cyan), (0.9,0.9,0.1)
(magenta) and (0.9,0.9,0.1) (blue).
Theorem 3 only gives a sufficient condition for conver-
gence to the boundary point. It would be very difficult to
construct the general conditions for non-convergence of the
co-evolutionary system. In the following section, we will
provide a specific type of payoff structure which results in
oscillating behaviors.
B. Periodic Orbits
We adopt the following payoff matrices which have been
used in [19]. They are modified from the general Prisoner
Dilemma (PD) game:
A(r) = (1− r)
[
T1 P1
R1 S1
]
+ r
[
R1 S1
T1 P1
]
, (11)
B(r) = (1− r)
[
T2 P2
R2 S2
]
+ r
[
R2 S2
T2 P2
]
, (12)
where P1 > S1, T1 >R1 and P2 > S2, T2 >R2 such that mutual
cooperation is a Nash equilibrium when r→ 0 and mutual
defection is a Nash equilibrium when r→ 1. Intuitively, more
players prefer to cooperate in the period of scarce resources
and incline to defect in the period of ample resources. These
environment-dependent payoff matrices can be rewritten as:
A(r) =
[
T1− (T1−R1)r P1− (P1− S1)r
R1+(T1−R1)r S1+(P1− S1)r
]
,
B(r) =
[
T2− (T2−R2)r P2− (P2− S2)r
R2+(T2−R2)r S2+(P2− S2)r
]
.
Using (6), we arrive at

x˙= x(1− x)[δPS1 +(δTR1 − δPS1)y](1− 2n)
y˙= y(1− y)[δPS2 +(δTR2− δPS2)x](1− 2n)
r˙ = r(1− r)[(1+θ1)x+(1+θ2)y− 2],
(13)
where δPS1 = P1− S1 > 0, δTR1 = T1−R1 > 0 and δPS2 =
P2− S2 > 0, δTR2 = T2−R2 > 0.
1) Equilibria and stability: Except for the eight isolated
fixed points identified in Lemma 1 (i.e., eight corners of the
domain), there is also a set of fixed points in the interior of
the cube, i.e.,
{
(x,y,r) : (1+θ1)x+(1+θ2)y= 2,r =
1
2
}
.
To study the local stability at these fixed points, one needs
to calculate their Jacobians. It is easy to check that all the
eight corner fixed points are unstable because each of their
Jacobian matrices has at least one positive eigenvalue.
In addition, the Jacobian matrix of an interior fixed point
(x∗,y∗,r∗) is of the following form:
J∗=


0 0 −2x∗(1− x∗)[δPS1 +(δTR1− δPS1)y∗]
0 0 −2y∗(1− y∗)[δPS2 +(δTR2− δPS2)x∗]
1+θ1
4
1+θ2
4
0

 ,
(14)
where (1+θ1)x
∗+(1+θ2)y∗ = 2.
In general the characteristic polynomial for a three dimen-
sional system takes the form
λ 3−Tλ 2−Kλ −D= 0, (15)
where T,D indicate the trace and determinant of the Jacobian
respectively. We calculate for the Jacobian (14)
T = trace(J∗) = 0, D= det(J∗) = 0.
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and
K =−1+θ1
2
y∗(1− y∗)[δPS2 +(δTR2− δPS2)x∗]
− 1+θ2
2
x∗(1− x∗)[δPS1 +(δTR1− δPS1)y∗]
< 0.
Thus, one can conclude the eigenvalues are λ1 = 0 and
λ2,3 =±
√−Ki, for which λ2,3 are conjugate pure imaginary
numbers. When the real parts of all the eigenvalues are zero,
one can only say that the interior equilibria are neutrally
stable for the linearized system. As a consequence, to an-
alyze the stability of the original nonlinear system through
linearization is not effective. Moreover, the method in [19]
utilizing the Hamiltonian system theory is not applicable
anymore because the system’s dimension is odd.
Through simulation in MATLAB, we find the trajectories
initialized with (x0,y0,r0) in the interior of the cube [0,1]
3
and not at the fixed points will exhibit closed periodic orbits
as shown in Fig. 2. Therefore, it is natural to ask whether
all the solutions for system (13) in (0,1)3 are either fixed
points or periodic orbits.
In the following subsection, we are going to show that
the neutral stability of linearized system at fixed points is
preserved in the original nonlinear system. We will first
analyze the trajectories around the equilibrium points, and
then apply an inverse derivation to prove this stability.
2) Reversible system: Before proving the claim on pe-
riodic orbits, we need to introduce the reversible system
theory [20], [21]. We say a transformation, denoted by G, is
an involution if the the composition of itself is the identify
mapping, i.e. G◦G= Identity.
Definition 1: A dynamical system is said to be reversible
if there is an involution in phase space which reverses the
direction of time.
Thus, a general system of coupled ordinary differential
equations,
dx
dt
= F(x), x ∈RN , (16)
is reversible if there is an involution G which reverses the
direction of time, i.e.,
dG(x)
dt
=−F(G(x)) (17)
and hence
dG|x ·F(x) =−F ◦G. (18)
The above definition implies that under the transformation
of the N-dimensional phase space by G, the system (16) is
transformed to that obtained by just putting t →−t, so that
under the combined action of involution and time reversal
the equations are invariant. An involution that achieves this
is called the time-reversal symmetry of the system.
By the transformation of t →−t, x→ x, y→ y and r→
1−r, one can easily verify the resulting system is the same as
the original one. So the system (13) is invariant under t→−t,
with the phase space involution G : x→ x,y→ y,r→ 1− r.
Hence, this system is reversible with respect to the above G
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Fig. 2: Simulation of Periodic Orbits with the parameters
R1 = 2, S1 = −2, T1 = 4 and P1 = 3; R2 = 3, S2 = 0,
T2 = 5 and P2 = 1; θ1 = 2 and θ2 = 2. (a) Time evolution
of states (x,y,r) with initial conditions (0.1,0.8,0.99) and
(0.6,0.6,0.6). (b) Periodic trajectories with initial conditions
(0.1,0.1,0.1) (red), (0.1,0.8,0.9) (green), (0.6,0.6,0.6) (ma-
genta), (0.2,0.6,0.6) (cyan) and (0.9,0.1,0.1) (blue).
and the fixed manifold Fix(G) is the plane {r= 1
2
}. Now we
review some intrinsic properties of the reversible system.
Definition 2 (Symmetric orbits [22]): Let o(x) be an orbit
of a dynamical system, i.e. o(x) = ϕt(x)|t ∈ R. Then o(x) is
reversibly symmetric with respect to G when the orbit is
set-wise invariant under G, i.e. G(o(x)) = o(x).
Lemma 4 (Periodic orbits for reversible systems [22]):
Let o(x) be an orbit of the flow of an autonomous vector
filed with time-reversal symmetry G. Then,
1) o(x) is symmetric with respect to G if and only
if o(x) intersects Fix(G), in which case the orbit
intersects Fix(G) in no more than two points and is
fully contained in Fix(G2).
2) An orbit o(x) intersects Fix(G) at precisely two points
if and only if the orbit is periodic (and not a fixed
point) and symmetric with respect to G.
This lemma is widely used for studying reversible dynamical
systems.
We continue to analyze system (13) with the mentioned
time-reversal symmetry G. First, we show that there is one
5
more invariant set for system (13).
Lemma 5 (Invariant set): For system (13), the open re-
gion, Ω = (0,1)3, is an (positively and negatively) invariant
set.
Proof: First it can be easily checked in the plane {r=
1} the point (0,0,1) is asymptotically stable for (13). Then,
denote one trajectory starting from an arbitrary point p in
the domain Ω = (0,1)3 by ϕ(t,0, p). If it approaches the
face {r = 1} at some time t1, then it will always converges
to the point (0,0,1) as t → ∞ because of the continuity of
x˙ and y˙. Consider the deleted neighborhood M of (0,0,1) in
Ω , i.e., M ⊂Ω. One can check that r˙ is always negative in
M. Thus, the trajectory cannot approach the point (0,0,1).
One can also analogously prove that the trajectory ϕ(t,0, p)
cannot reach other faces either. Hence, the positive invariance
of Ω is proved.
If the trajectory starts from the region R3\Ω, it may reach
the boundary of [0,1]3. But it cannot get into the interior,
because the 6 faces of the cube are positively invariant. This
corresponds to the negative invariance of Ω.
In conclusion, we have proved that the open set Ω=(0,1)3
is positively and negatively invariant.
Now we are ready to prove the main result.
Theorem 6: The interior of the phase space, Ω=(0,1)3, is
filled with infinitely many independent periodic orbits, each
centered at an interior equilibrium point.
Proof: First we divide the phase space Ω = (0,1)3
into 4 regions by the two planes {r = 1
2
} and {(1+θ1)x+
(1+ θ2)y = 2}, which intersect at the line of the interior
equilibrium points. Denote the four regions by
Ω1 : {1
2
< r < 1,(1+θ1)x+(1+θ2)y> 2};
Ω2 : {1
2
< r < 1,(1+θ1)x+(1+θ2)y< 2};
Ω3 : {0< r < 1
2
,(1+θ1)x+(1+θ2)y< 2};
Ω4 : {0< r < 1
2
,(1+θ1)x+(1+θ2)y> 2}.
From (13) it is easy to determine that the sign of the
derivative r˙ is positive in Ω1, Ω4 and negative in Ω2, Ω3,
respectively. Furthermore, the signs of the derivatives x˙, y˙ are
negative in Ω1, Ω2 and positive in Ω3, Ω4,
Now, we consider an arbitrary trajectory ϕ(t,0,q) starting
from a point q = (x0,y0,r0) in Ω2. By using Lemma 5 one
can exclude the trajectory going towards the face, as a result
it will always stay inside the cube.
Then, in Ω2 we choose a closed subset S= { 12 ≤ r≤ r0}∩Ω2.
It is clear that the derivative r˙ in subset S remains negative.
As the subset S is compact and the function on the right-
hand side of equation r˙ is continuous, there must exist a
small number a> 0 such that r˙ ≤−a.
If the trajectory cannot go across the plane {r = 1
2
}, then
the projection of ϕ(t,0,q) to the r axis at time τ will be
r(τ) = r(0)+
∫ τ
0
z˙dt ≤ r(0)− a(τ− 0)
Then when the time τ goes to infinity, we get
lim
τ→∞ r(τ)≤ r(0)− limτ→∞a(τ − 0) =−∞
This result contradicts the boundedness of the subset. There-
fore, the trajectory will traverse the plane {r= 1
2
} and always
goes into the region Ω3.
Following similar steps, one can verify the trajectory will
cross the plane {(1+θ1)x+(1+θ2)y= 2} by checking the
signs of x˙ or y˙, and enters into the region Ω4, and then it
continues to cross the plane {r = 1
2
} again. The geometric
view of the whole process is depicted in Fig. (3).
In view of Lemma 4, the trajectory will finally return to
the starting point and form a closed orbit because it intersects
Fix(G) at precisely two points. Hence, we have proved that
each trajectory will form a periodic orbit. Immediately one
can claim that every closed orbit is neutrally stable since no
other trajectories will converge to it.
Fig. 3: The process of forming a periodic orbit with initial
point q.
Then we can deduce the property of the internal equilib-
rium points.
Corollary 6.1: The interior equilibrium points are neu-
trally stable for the nonlinear system (13).
By showing all the trajectories around the equilibria are in-
dependently periodic orbits, it is intuitive to get the neutrally
stability of the corresponding equilibrium points.
The periodic trajectory of system (13) presents an un-
usual phenomenon, namely the state of two populations
and environment oscillate dynamically. Under the payoff
matrices of (10) and (11), the population profiles with the
environment can evolve periodically without the extinction of
any specify type strategic players. The occurrence of closed
orbits is more complicated than convergence to limit cycles
or equilibria, because how the co-evolutionary dynamics
evolve depends highly on the system’s initial states.
Remark 1: When the payoff matrices are symmetric,
namely A(r) = B(r), the dynamics of the resulting system
will be mainly similar to the asymmetric case, but has
another feature, namely there is a symmetric plane {x= y}
and no trajectory can go across this plane.
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It can be easily verified that the new system is invariant
under the simple transformation x → y and y → x. Thus
the system is symmetric with respect to the plane {x = y}.
If there is a trajectory φ(t,0,x0,y0,r0), there is always a
symmetric trajectory φ(t,0,y0,x0,r0) for this system. If the
trajectory φ(t,0,x0,y0,r0) crosses the plane {x= y} at time
t1, it is easy to see that at the same time t1 the symmetric
trajectory will also cross the plane {x = y} at the same
point. This result contradicts the fact that no two trajectories
can cross each other for an autonomous dynamical system.
Hence, as a result no trajectory can go across the symmetric
plane. The intuitive interpretation of this property is that the
proportion of cooperators in one population cannot exceed
that of the other if there are fewer cooperators in this
population in the beginning.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
We have proposed a new framework to study multi-
population evolutionary game dynamics with environmental
feedback and investigated whether and how convergence and
coexistence take place in the new closed-loop system. The
influence of dynamic and asymmetric payoff matrices have
been studied in depth for two interacting populations. Two
situations, convergence and dynamically coexistence, have
been clarified through different approaches. In particular,
the scenarios where oscillation offers the best predictions
of long-term behavior have been identified for the prisoner
dilemma game. The obtained results can be very useful to
describe the evolution of multi-community societies in which
individuals’ payoffs and societal feedback interact. In the
future, we will generalize the framework to multi-population
situation. We are also interested in looking into networked
populations. It is also of great interest to study different
payoff matrices.
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